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Abstract 
 
This paper engages the current vogue for addressing the space of the political through 
aesthetics. It argues that the turn to aesthetics to open up the space of the political risks 
reproducing particular historical ontologies and metaphysical principles inherent to the concept 
of aesthetics. These principles interpellate creative energies, expressions, and shared social 
relationships into forms that are made recognisable by particular historical and European 
geographical inflections of political legitimacy. As a result, aesthetics and a “politics of 
aesthetics” actually reproduces the social and political limits it is often invoked to overcome. 
Instead, the paper argues for a need to decolonise the register of the aesthetic, and so 
assumptions about “the political”, through a more radical attention to ontologies of difference 
expressed as aesthesis. Drawing from previous work in the field, decolonial and indigenous 
critiques are mobilised to show how the category of the aesthetic reproduces fundamentally 
self-limiting frames. The paper proceeds by explaining the relevance of attunement to the 
production of the subject in Kant’s legacy for aesthetic theory. It then situates the limits of the 
recent attention to geo-aesthetics as also invoking metaphysical latencies. A discussion of 
decolonising agendas, aesthesis, and indigenous performative critiques of the politics of 
recognition are briefly explored as specific means to potentially re-think aesthetics as a 
category. The paper ends with a short reflection on the implications of the argument for the 
sites and geographies of “the political” and the meaning of critique. 
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Do we value art or experience simply for its disturbance of our limits, in which 
case we are left with the goal of self-reflexivity: art makes us aware of the 
distance and mediation of all knowing. Is politics nothing more than liberal self-
critique, where a certain not knowing yields a chastening humility, but nothing 
positive or genuinely destructive? 
             (Colebrook 2014: 147, emphasis in original) 
 
Introduction 
 
The interrelationships of aesthetics and politics have, for some time now, been a 
productive focus for critical and cultural geographers. Many of these engagements have been 
influenced either directly by Rancière’s (2004) “politics of aesthetics”, or indirectly by the 
conversations inaugurated with his now persuasive work (for ex. Dikeç, 2005; Cant and Morris, 
2006; Dixon, 2009; Gabrys and Yusoff, 2012; Jazeel, 2013; Shaw and Sharp, 2013; Dikeç, 
2015; Hawkins and Straughan, 2015; Jazeel and Mookherjee, 2015). Broadly, the former 
treatments might be said to be drawn to how “the political” derives its pertinence from the 
dissensus created by aesthetic experience (Dikeç, 2015: 113). Their claim is that aesthetic 
experience becomes relevant for the question of politics because it reveals the play of 
difference and division within the ostensible commons of human engagement (Rancière, 2011: 
1). The other latter engagements (ex. Dixon et al. 2012a; 2012b; Yusoff, 2014; 2015), while 
also invoking the importance of aesthetics for differentiating the spaces of ethics and politics, 
draw out different, indirect purposes regarding the conceptual tradition shared by Rancière. 
These might be said to emphasise how a tradition that locates itself within what Kant 
inaugurated as the discourse of modern aesthetics may invoke “abyssal moment[s]” (Dixon, et 
al. 2012b: 292), that is, the implicate capacity of all material gradients, living or non, to be read 
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as aesthetic. For such readings, aesthetics is relevant to questions of politics and ethics in 
highlighting endless deferrals through the textual and material play of (mis)reading and 
contingency. Both the direct and indirect senses place an emphasis on how aesthetic experience 
reveals always already fundamental openings for epistemic and political claims; for each, 
aesthetics is politics in perpetua.     
Exploring the relationships of endless limits within aesthetics and politics has been 
productive within geography for good reasons. They are summarized here with three ‘R’s’: 
resistance, reflexivity, and relationality.  
First, for critical geographers, aesthetics enables a means to conceptualise resistance to 
empirical, pragmatic, and normative forms of knowledge production legitimated by an 
oppressive bio-politics of state, capital, and data. Aesthetics engages that most difficult work: 
attempting to “resist mere appropriation by the dominant” (Spivak, 2003: 11). But, to do so, 
without also legitimizing dominance, aesthetics must be reflexive. It must be relentlessly self-
conscious, in order, as Walter Benjamin famously warned, to counter the tendency that “…all 
efforts to aestheticize politics culminate in one point. That one point is war” (Benjamin, 2002: 
121). In other words, we must always be critically self-conscious about the relationships 
between aesthetics and politics so as to preclude the aesthetic allures of political extremism. 
Benjamin’s remarks were made in the context of fascism in Europe and Stalinism in the Soviet 
Union; we may invoke his caution today against, for instance, the appeal to some of ISIS, or to 
others of Donald Trump’s American presidential candidacy.  
Second, then, critical attention to aesthetics encourages reflexion in order to open, as 
suggested at the beginning, self-conscious thought and praxis to proliferating futures of 
sensible difference. Thinking and feeling otherwise is possible; aesthetics, ostensibly, 
cultivates how. Hence, art and creative sensibilities are important for translating, imagining, 
and performing new individual and collective ways of understanding being-with others in the 
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polis of worlds. Part of that attention also entails cultivating new insights regarding the 
collective forms sensibility takes.  
As a consequence, third, the trans-disciplinary moment continues within geography 
wherein critical energies are focused on the diverse, relational materialities shaping sensibility, 
embodiment, and transversal agency. Attending ecologically to aesthesis (sensual perception) 
– that is, to the “horizon of affects” (Corcoran, 2010: 2) and felt assemblages that constitute 
the more-than-human capacities for sense and perceptibility – affords relational means to 
recognise, and to deliberate, plural modes of becoming otherwise. An aesthetics of politics, 
then, is resistant, relational, and, crucially, reflexive. 
There is a problem, however, with too simple an appeal to aesthetics to legitimate “the 
political” via an opening to the unthought. The following paper is concerned to identify and 
situate this problem. In what follows, I do not argue against the broad ethics that art is often 
used to foreground – i.e. the three “R’s” above. Nor do I argue against art itself, nor art’s value 
for feeling, thinking, and becoming otherwise. Creative expression, self-aware concern, and 
sensual freedom are undoubtedly essential for ethico-political life; there is little, if anything, 
more important. What I do want to locate within contemporary discussions of geographical 
aesthetics and politics are two inter-related problematics. The first is the reticence to recognise 
that aesthetics is a formal category invented to take account of “…the system of a priori forms 
determining what presents itself to sense experience. It…simultaneously determines the place 
and stakes of politics as a form of experience” (Rancière, 2006a: 13). It is a theory for making 
sense of the sensible, not the material and textual forms aesthesis (sensibility) takes. Unlike 
Kant, who argues for a universal, apriori character for aesthetic judgement, Rancière argues 
that, as a formal category, aesthetics is “an historically determined concept” (2006b: 1) for 
making sense of aesthesis. What is important for the present analysis is the fact that aesthetics 
is an invented category on which an approach to thought and sociality is based (Mignolo, 2011: 
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20). The second problematic emerges from the first. If aesthetics is a way of rendering 
meaningful sense and sensibility for thought, then, importantly, we need to recognise that it 
also assumes, and mobilises, a particular idea of a thinking subject. This idea of the subject is 
itself equally a product of a specific historical geography, the same co-implicate geography 
that gave rise to the conceptual invention of aesthetics as a formal category: 18th century 
Europe.  
The question that follows from these problematics is quite simple: if we appeal to 
aesthetics as a politics of making possible, then, without reconstructing the category of 
aesthetics itself, do we not, in mobilising the category for thought and action, also presume an 
idea of the critical subject that thinks, and that, consequently, is necessarily politicisable? In 
other words, by invoking aesthetics to think about politics, the paper asks: are we also not 
implicitly invoking co-determinate categories and grand narratives, the very frameworks a 
“politics of aesthetics” is asked to re-think? This is not to suggest that any critical reflection 
made through an appeal to aesthetics is false; there are undoubtedly benefits to a critical subject 
reflecting on its sensibilities and their limitations within worlds of difference. But simply 
invoking a “politics of aesthetics” neither necessarily entails radicality nor openness. Indeed, a 
“politics of aesthetics” is not radical. How transformative can a radical politics be, one that 
emerges from appeals to an unreconstructed aesthetics, if it necessarily assumes a metaphysical 
category (i.e. the subject) as the unit of politicisation? As the paper will show, a “politics of 
aesthetics” does re-enforce an Enlightenment idea of either a transcendental or historical 
subject (in the epigraph, Colebrook emphasises this as “our”) upon which the theory and 
concept of aesthetics itself depends. In a critical moment wherein geographers and the wider 
social sciences and humanities are increasingly impelled to account for alterity, relational 
ontologies, and the commensurate collapse of classical social binaries (i.e. subject/object, 
nature/culture, etc.), we cannot assume that invoking aesthetics necessarily does the critical 
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and political work necessary to problematize or decolonise these relations. I argue, in what 
follows, that, as a concept, “aesthetics” actually risks reproducing the social and political limits 
it is often invoked to overcome.   
Rancière is not particularly concerned with this as a problem. He is, largely, an 
unreconstructed Kantian who is quite content with positing a subject for whom reflective self-
awareness is “…disconnect[ed] from the habitual conditions of sensible experience” (2006: 1). 
Kant and Rancière’s aesthetic subject is produced in, and for, an experience manifest by a 
nature-culture distinction, one for whom subjectivity is the self-aware and critical navigation 
of self-understanding in its phenomenal separation from the noumenal world. For geographers 
also comfortable with the modern, Eurocentric idea of the transcendental and/or 
phenomenological subject, aesthetics – as a formal system for thought – together with its 
consequent politics, may, similarly, not be a problem. For those seeking, however, to 
provincialise “a politics of aesthetics” either through appeals to other than Western human 
sensibilities and categories for which such separations and dualisms are deeply problematic, or 
simply anathema to how they live their lives (ex. Spivak, 2012; Jazeel, 2013), or to the 
promisory potential of relational ontologies in the posthuman or more-than-human mode (ex. 
Clark, 2012; Dixon et al., 2012a; 2012b; Yusoff et al. 2012; Yusoff, 2014; Hawkins and 
Straughan, 2015: 10; Yusoff, 2015), more work may need to be done than simply invoking 
aesthetics to disturb hegemonies or open up alter- or counter-political possibilities. As a 
discursive category, aesthetics is neither simply descriptive of aesthesis nor ontologically 
neutral.  
Such are the questions posed, I suggest, by alterity, human and otherwise. Similar 
questions have been posed by decolonial and indigenous scholarships in the effort to decolonise 
aesthetics (Overing and Passes, 2000; Mignolo et al, 2011; Mignolo and Vasquez, 2013; 
Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2014). They are situated here in an argument for a much stronger claim 
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for aesthesis than the simple referent “aesthetics” can provide. I argue that we need both to 
decolonise the ontologies latent in unreconstructed appeals to aesthetics, and to recognise that 
in doing so, the scope and range of political aesthesis opens up transformative, and perhaps 
even troubling, possibilities for things like critique and the subject of politics. 
In developing an argument that queries, and potentially decolonises, aesthetics, I first 
turn to the role that attunement plays in both the conventional Kantian category, and to the 
questions it raises for the more radical approaches advocated here. After the paper frames the 
significance of attunement for Kant’s aesthetic theory, it situates the need to rethink how 
sensibility is invoked by turning to alternative approaches – geo-aesthetics, decolonial, and 
indigenous critique – that problematise Kant’s category as a starting point for thinking about 
what art and feeling offer for “the political”. Indigenous and decolonial critiques are invoked 
for two reasons: first, as a way of provincialising aesthetics via aesthesis (ex. Mignolo et al., 
2011); and, second, to illustrate how “aesthetics” and a “politics of aesthetics” are conceptual 
frameworks that depend upon, and reproduce, Western ontologies and colonising meta-
narratives. I conclude with a brief exploration of the implications of the argument for the sites 
and geographies of “the political” and the meaning of critique. 
 
Judgement, Sensus Communis and Attunement 
Judgement 
While geographers often turn to the Kantian tradition to ground reflections on aesthetic 
theory and its potential for action (ex. Dikeç, 2015, passim; Hawkins and Straughan, 2015: 4), 
it is important to remember that, for Kant, the aesthetic is a class, or species, of judgement. 
What is significant in Kant’s systematisation of the concept of the aesthetic, and distinct from 
earlier accounts (for ex. Baumgarten’s invention of the concept in 1735), is that aesthetic claims 
arise in the making of judgements about the relation between subjects and objects. Aesthetic 
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judgement is not a capacity of sense itself, but, as Kant writes in Critique of Judgement, it is a 
function of the uniquely human ability “to rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers” 
(§40, 1987: 160). Those who “lay claim to the name of human being” (Ibid.) are those able to 
abstract from the experience of sense in order to judge.  
Aesthetic judgements are important, for Kant, in at least three ways. First, they are types 
of judgement that enable navigating a central problematic at the heart of attempting to unify 
philosophy around a universalisable, transcendental argument. They reveal the transcendental 
conditions necessary for making any act of judging possible. Second, they navigate the 
problematic of unity by being a type of judgement that unites, or, at least, excites the potential 
of uniting, imagination and understanding within the transcendental conditions for cognition. 
Such union or harmony of the faculties is projected as a capacity possible in others deemed 
human. Recognising in others the capacity for aesthetic harmonisation or attunement of the 
faculties is also one way, Kant argued, for recognising capacities to think and act morally. For 
him, morality and rational judgement are, however, only the domain of limited geographies.  
In spite to his undoubted influence, Kant is also infamous for “Section Four” of his 
short 1764 treatise, On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime wherein he notes, amidst much 
other racist and nationalist nonsense, that “…savages have little feeling for the beautiful in 
moral understanding” (1960: 112). Citing these constitutive exclusions in Kant, Hamid 
Dabashi’s recent book length commentary on the legacy of colonialist attitudes within 
scholarship, Can Non-Europeans Think?, reminds us of the necessity “…to mark the historical 
enabling of any philosophical legacy by the imperial power of denying it to others”(2015: 259). 
In what follows, it is important to note that appeals to “our”, “we”, “us” and “humans” are 
qualified under the Kantian schematic as always already produced by colonising categories and 
logics.   
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Third, and crucial for the transcendental account, aesthetic judgements have a purchase 
beyond individual, subjective experience; this purchase is a universal, logical principle of 
cognition, at least for some European subjects. The argument goes that we (Northern 
Europeans) share certain commonalities of feeling about art, beauty, landscape, or the like. But 
the indeterminate feelings we share are not adjudicable by appeal to determinate concepts: 
there is no number or formula that we can agree on to say that a poem or painting is good or 
beautiful. Nor, the argument continues, can we appeal to the object itself, for the sense object 
is made meaningful only through the apriori conditions of human thought that shape 
experience, which we also share. Kant set about to address the problem that emerges from this 
by asking: why are we able to agree, or disagree, despite indeterminate feeling? How is it that 
we can share or empathise with feelings about objects that move us, without also appealing to 
a concept against which that feeling is measured and understood? 
 
Sensus Communis 
The answer lies, for Kant, not in a shared proximity or ontological attunement across 
material beings or object relations (see Hawkins and Straughan, 2015: 290), but in a subjective, 
individual awareness of the mental capacities within one’s own mind that enable it to recognise 
the same theoretically possible capacities in others it labels human. This reflective self-
awareness he terms sensus communis, an abstractive ability shared “by all of us” (Kant, 1987, 
§40:160). Sensus communis is not common sense, but “…a power to judge that in reflecting 
takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else’s way of presenting [something], in 
order as it were to compare our own judgement with human reason in general” (Ibid, emphasis 
in original). The sensus communis is a subjective capacity to judge others’ similarity, not by 
reflecting on actual determinate judgments, but on the formal possibility of their commensurate 
judgements, and our ability to empathise with their possible feelings and experiences.1 It is, 
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thus, an abstractive removal by the critical subject “…from as much as possible whatever is 
matter, ie. sensation” (Ibid.).  
It also serves as a universal rule for appreciating the commonality of human 
understanding. Sensus communis is an imaginative capacity for human understanding (but, 
recall, a particular human); cognition and empirical knowledge become possible to the extent 
that the faculties of understanding and imagination resonate for one another. Kant terms this 
crucial feature of cognitive harmony, attunement (Stimmung). 
 
Attunement 
Attunement, as one might expect, is a process for and by human cognition in its 
purposive relationship with the differential sensibilities objects present. It is “…the subjective 
condition of cognition” (Ibid., §21: 88). It is also the basis for presupposing sensus communis 
(Ibid, 87) and the means for rationalising and communicating the universalisability of 
judgements. Objects present themselves in experience; the extent to which they occasion, in 
the subject, an attunement of the cognitive faculties (i.e understanding and imagination) is a 
matter, Kant attributes, to feeling. Communication of this feeling depends upon “…the 
attunement of the cognitive powers…required for cognition in general” (Ibid, 88). Differences 
in feeling – aestheses, after all, are different and arise from difference – are reflected in 
different mental attunements. 
In addition, one’s overall capacity for communication and judgement itself also reveals 
an underlying principle of attunement: “…there must be one attunement in which this inner 
relation is most conducive to the (mutual) quickening of the two mental powers with a view to 
cognition…in general” (Ibid.). This ideal or refined attunement, and the sensus communis, 
together represent the philosophical perfectibility of a cognitive union between imagination 
and understanding. It is a union that strives, through aesthetic attunement, to awaken in us the 
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sense of our own rational mastery over particular being. An attuned, cognizing subject 
subsumes sensual particularity to rational generality.  
The fact of its unified and communicative striving in light of the logical possibilities of 
others means that aesthetics, for Kant, operates as a process to bridge, in systematic ways, 
judgements about “the moral law within” (the concept of freedom) and “the starry sky above” 
(the concept of nature). As a systematic theory of the imagination, understanding, and 
communicability of sense, the goal of aesthetics is to harmonise or attune subjective faculties 
in the fulfilment of human ideality. What is most important, for Kant, about attunement and 
the sensus communis as features of aesthetics, however, is that the ideal or perfectible harmony 
of the faculties is a constituting, logical principle of subjective cognition. Imagination is the 
mode by which the subject reaches out, indeterminately, to the sensible; understanding finds 
structure in subsuming particular sensibility under a general concept, never the other way 
around (Wolfe, 2006: n.p.). Aesthetics brings them together in the harmonic superiority of 
human reason and so legitimizes universal cognitive claims by a subject. Attunement is “…the 
necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be 
presupposed in any logic and any principle of cognitions” (Kant 1987, §21: 88).  
Important for the argument here is the fact that the indeterminate play of cognition 
incorporates or subsumes the object judged as beautiful to apriori conditions. Aesthetics, as a 
category for thought’s genealogy within modernity, is about how subjects judge. 
Transcendentally, for Kant, and more historically for post-Kantians like Rancière, the locus 
classicus is still an idea of the reflecting subject, a posited agency mobilised for action in the 
world. Indeed, the reason I have spent some time emphasising the category through attunement 
and the sensus communis is simply to underscore how Kantian aesthetics is part of a system 
for delimiting the subject’s power to make judgements. I turn now to the effects this legacy has 
had on readings that embark on a “politics of aesthetics”. 
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Metaphysics of an aporetic subject 
There is little question that art and feeling as read through the lens of the aesthetic are 
capable of disturbing normative sensibilities by “…refram[ing] the network of relationships 
between spaces and times, subjects and objects, the common and the singular” (Rancière, 2002, 
as quoted in Dixon, 2009: 412). Different sensibilities demand different cognitive attunements. 
But, as I have suggested above, if sense is disruptive, it is so for a specific idea of the attunement 
done by an agent and, therein, for a specific idea of what constitutes both art and that on which 
art acts: the subject. To quote from Ranciere, 
Aesthetics…designates a specific regime of visibility and intelligibility of art, which is 
inscribed in a reconfiguration of the categories of sensible experience and its 
interpretation. It is the new type of experience that Kant systematised in the Critique of 
Judgement. For Kant, aesthetic experience implies a certain disconnection from the 
habitual conditions of sensible experience (2006: 1, emphasis added). 
Importantly, aesthetics inaugurates a formal means of understanding an experiential mode of 
subjectivity, what Rancière refers to here as “the new type of experience” (Ibid). But, this 
subject is one for whom self-reflection is possible only in so far as it is disconnected, 
transcendentally and phenomenologically, from the heterogeneous objects that constitute what 
is experienced as the material world. Aesthetic attunement is posited for a rational construct 
that thinks, the “I” of “ergo sum” or, in Kant’s case, “…a transcendental subject of thought = x, 
which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates” (Kant, 1988: 142). 
Indeed, for the moderns since Kant, critique is precisely the navigation of this self-awareness 
in and for its limitations. 
Poststructuralist accounts of the critical subject emphasise textual and cognitive limits 
in an effort to de-naturalise political claims. In fact, this limit, and its self-awareness, which is 
a function of aesthetic attunement (see Spivak, 2012), inheres the merit of judgement for a 
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responsible ethics and politics. In the epigraph with which I started, Colebrook queries this 
politics as one of “chastening humility”. Such approaches to ethics and politics are often 
captured under the term “aporetic”. Aporetic positions, after de Man and Derrida, make a virtue 
of critical self-awareness and the abyssal, impossibility of justice. They are “…a guide to 
practical being and doing as if one could be ethical toward the other, all the while knowing that 
this is impossible” (Wainwright, 2013: 70, emphasis in original). The effort is not to wallow in 
passivity, but the opposite: to impel acting toward possibility through self-criticality. As such, 
attunement via the aesthetic becomes a means to capture not the impossibility of representation, 
but the abyssal, non-exhaustiveness of political subjects (Dikeç, 2015: 177), human and non-
human (Dixon et al. 2012b), and their always already excessive capacities to become otherwise 
through aesthetic experience and practice.  
Kant literally figures the genealogy of the aporetic mode. In fact, there is a chain of 
conceptual relationships at the heart of the denaturalising imperative that is fundamental to 
most critical and poststructuralist thought. It continues today in the recognition of textual 
contingency (as read predominantly through de Saussure’s structuralist semiotics), is inflected 
with observations about power and material ownership shaping knowledge production, and 
returns through critique (see Butler, 2006) to Kant’s sapere aude, “Have the courage to use 
your own understanding”. But courage is framed within a subject’s experiential recognition of 
the limits of reason alone. Thought’s predicates here are simply a more uncertain subject, but 
one still situated, and crucially, situated as separate from that which makes it think: the object 
world. Aporetic critique, denaturalising critique, and critique that invokes aesthetics to attune 
thought to shared sensibilities, all boils down to negotiating the problematic of a fundamental, 
insuperable separation between subject and world. Which is why theorists like Dikeç, Arendt, 
Rancière, Spivak, or even Foucault’s “aesthetics of ethics” (ex. 1982; 2005), all return, 
canonically, to Kant. To do otherwise is to open the door to a radically different account, or 
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dissolution, of the subject, thought, experience, of critique, semiotics, politics, and of aesthetics 
– even object worlds. 
Never-the-less, Kant is very clear: aesthetic attunement is disinterested in the world; it 
is not an attunement that comes from the world, but is an attunement that legislates over itself. 
Political aesthetics, as it is often read today, is a tradition that explicitly, and implicitly, does 
the same. It commits us, therein, to a politics of the subject defined by a transcendental 
negotiation of critique’s limits. If we privilege aesthetics as subjective attunement and 
disruption to “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception”, what Rancière terms “the 
distribution of the sensible” (2004: 12), then we also privilege a particular approach to a subject 
for whom sense is being perceived. But, it is also posited as necessary for becoming political. 
My claim is simple: an unreconstructed aesthetics will not reveal a reconstructed subject or, 
necessarily, a reconstructed politics. This is because it assumes both a metaphysical principle 
and an ontological correlate of subjectivisation, each a product of a particular modern, 
geographical history. Yet, aesthetics is often invoked to do precisely this more radical de-
stabilising work. A contradiction or problem ensues. 
 
Decolonising the aesthetic subject 
As I noted at the beginning, aesthetics is often invoked because it is seen to negotiate, 
creatively, an epistemic commitment to attuning sensibility within the insuperable 
contingencies and separations of word and world, experience and thing-itself, noumena and 
phenomena: resistantly, reflexively, and relationally. In doing so, the emphasis, ironically, risks 
precluding many voices, forms of life, imaginative possibilities, and attunement practices that 
aim to be politically transformative precisely because they do not begin within modern 
epistemological distinctions like nature-culture, for whom aesthetics signifies neither a distinct 
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cognitive, nor even sensible, register, indeed, for whom the category “aesthetic” is a false or 
colonising imposition.  
 In this section, I approach, if only very briefly, two modes of analysis that attempt to 
think the aesthetic subject differently, and from positions that mobilise radical alterity for 
critical politics. The first is the effort made within cultural geography for a geo-aesthetics. The 
second is an appeal that draws both on decolonial work, including indigenous critiques of 
politics, aesthetics, and the subject for whom the predicates of thought are different and distinct 
than those often assumed by a Euro-enlightenment mode. In respect of the former, I suggest 
that, while the emphasis on the more-than-human opens potential to a more radical decentring 
critique, aesthetics, as a formal category, itself remains the frame through which aesthesis is 
made legible. The result is often a less transformative critique than first imagined. In respect 
of the second mode, following Mignolo, I suggest the need to consider the silencing 
problematics that aesthetics, as a colonising category, presents for aesthesis, and for the need 
to read creative expression through different predicates.  
Indigenous scholarship offers one important way to figure aesthesis otherwise than 
through the colonising category of aesthetics. Appeal to indigenous ontologies is made in the 
spirit of both provincializing theoretical touchstones, but also to emphasize how ontologies that 
derive meaning not in separations of subjects from objects, natures from cultures, etc. 
necessarily re-figure or pre-figure the resonance and meaning of aesthesis for politics 
(Coulthard, 2014: 18). In other words, sometimes aestheses simply cannot be recognised by 
extant orders, including those that seek to subsume them under categories like aesthetics. 
Indigeneity is also invoked so as to highlight how the Amer-European theoretical frameworks 
often underpinning geo-aesthetics and the ontological turn have long been prefigured by 
indigenous perspectives and scholarships (Sundberg, 2014; Todd, 2014). This is not to suggest 
that indigenous approaches to aesthesis and whose categories we have learned, in our technical 
		 17	
disciplinary vocabularies, to call “art” and “aesthetics” are necessarily also better. That would 
risk romanticism. It is to suggest, simply, that they are different. We cannot assume that 
mobilising the historical category aesthetics and what it means for politics translates across 
ontological domains or social worlds.   
 
The Limits of Geo-aesthetics 
Influenced by posthumanism, geo-aesthetics offers itself as a complex and potentially 
productive way forward from the limits of the transcendental, human agent (see for example, 
Dixon 2009; Clark 2012; Dixon et al. 2012a, 2012b; Yusoff 2012; 2014; 2015). As I read it, 
geo-aesthetics locates itself within what a modernist legacy of aesthetics makes possible as a 
field and method of enquiry, but seeks to move beyond such limits within immanent critique 
to the potentials non-human aesthesis. As Dixon et al. (2012a) suggest, geo-aesthetics explores 
how sense-making emerges, experientially and reproductively, as a function of organic 
metabolism itself. More-than-human approaches, broadly, begin to trace how politics and 
ethics opens not simply to the value of de-naturalised indeterminacy, a politics of the 
(impossible) to-come, but to attunements that come from the world. These attunements seek to 
dissemble constructs of word and world in order to re-naturalise human agency and cognition 
as functions of temporalities long preceding us – of chthonic and extra-planetary spatialities. 
Geo-aesthetics thus introduces a cosmo-political dimension to the art of judgement. As Yusoff 
notes: “…contracting and elaborating on imperceptible cosmic, biological, and geologic forces 
of the universe, art is the materialisation of these forces on the body: sensations that allow our 
becoming otherwise” (2012: 972; see also Hawkins and Straughan, 2015: 288). Geo-aesthetics, 
then, is an effort to construct a modality of “geo-social” “…proximity, contact, and at times 
inter-mingling and entanglement” (Hawkins and Straughan, 2015: 290, emphasis added). 
Proximity, contact, and entanglement still imply, as the “at times’” reveals, ontological 
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separability; the subject persists in latent ways. “Entanglement” might also be the wrong word. 
A subject tangled up with materialities from which it cannot extricate itself is still distinct from 
those tangles. And entanglements convey snarls of difference, conflictual strictures from which 
“we” (i.e. posited liberal subjects) seek to be free. Latent political humanisms creep back in 
with these conceptual vocabularies, and undermine the radical potential geo-aesthetics has for 
orienting thought to our fundamental de-subjectifying plurality within cosmo-political alterity. 
The reason for this slippage resides in the extent to which ethico-political meaning is 
conventionally produced by recognising the contingencies emergent from a semiotic register 
that separates word and world, text and matter, a register upheld by aesthetics. Geo-aesthesis 
needs to overcome these latencies.      
If sensibility is read, as the geo-social needs it to be, as an ontological facet of the more-
than-human, then more-than-human worlds, including the inorganic, need to be read as 
themselves semiotic (see for ex. Bains, 2006; Barad, 2007: 375-377; Bracken, 2007; Kohn, 
2013). For the critical gap between text and world, the gap on which critique has depended 
from Kant onwards, dissolves into the presentness of “pure feeling” (Massumi, 2015: 2), or 
aesthesis as such. Just aesthesis. As Massumi continues, “…[t]he world’s phenomenal 
constitution must be understood as the infractive appearance of a pure thinking-feeling behind 
which there is neither substance nor subject” (2015: 4). This more radical approach poses a 
much more fundamental challenge to the Kantian tradition of the subject separated from the 
object – it (if we can even call it that) does not simply inter-mingle now and then, it is! – than 
a simple appeal to aesthetics is able to mount.  
By implication, aesthetics as a category for thought itself needs to be jettisoned or 
radically re-thought as a specific tradition of categorising sense and sensibility for a cognising 
agent separated from the world. Attunement from and by the object (whether tree, animal, 
molecule, sound or whatever) is not, under the ontological approach geo-sociality affords, a 
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reflective commensuration with representational objects as such, but with the semiotic 
relationships that singular object relations enfold as worlds or worldings. Which is what all 
good art does. It moves. Literally. We become different amalgams of sense as thought. The 
shiver, the tear, the little leap of joy, the indifference, whether spoken by colour, reverb, touch, 
or word, these are participation in the immediacy of material relation (Bracken, 2002: 324). 
Attunement by the object-semiotic world, and not a specifically aesthetic, categorical sense, 
requires a pluriversal commitment rather than distanced attunement to difference within an 
unknowable, shared universe. It is a politics of commitment: ‘commit’, from the Latin, 
committere, to join and entrust in a putting forth, or sending out; as against ‘critique’, from the 
Greek krinein, which means to separate and decide in judgement. The ontological emphasis of 
committing lies less in constitutive impossibility than in necessary, compositional plurality that 
enacts or commits or entrusts with diverse, incommensurable worlds. The issue here becomes 
not aesthetics, for that category no longer maintains a grip on a dispersed geo-subject of non-
duality, but non-linguistic semiosis within which commitment arises as sense. 
 
Aesthesis 
If we frame aesthetics from a tradition located since Kant, which has been the dominant 
propensity thus far, we risk not dissembling the colonising register of the aesthetic itself. It is 
colonising because it posits a separate and separating subject as a critical, self-reflexive unit 
necessary for politicisation. Instead, we need to attend to how the sensibilities themselves 
pluralise “genuinely creative and destructive” (Colebrook, epigraph) capacities in terms of 
which thoughts otherwise arise. In not doing so, we risk continuing to exclude those for whom 
thought or the aesthetic is not a register of experience as we have learned it in our Euro-
modernist tradition. This is part of the argument that Mignolo offers up in his effort to 
“decolonise aestheTics” from “…a normativity that colonise[s] the senses…so as to liberate 
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them from the regulations of modern, postmodern, and alter-modern aestheTics” (2013; see 
also Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2014).2 A “decolonial aesthesis”, he argues, “…does not seek to 
regulate a canon, but rather to allow for the plurality of ways to relate to…the sensible that 
have been silenced” (2013, n.p.). 
Think, for instance, of the non-European perspectives for whom the separation from 
“nature” is not a pre-condition of critique or reflexivity?3 It would follow from what has thus 
far been argued that, if aesthetics, even in the geo-social mode, does not at the same time attend 
to a potential complicity in what Mignolo terms, “…a normativity that colonized the senses” 
(Ibid.), it cannot assume itself, unproblematically, to be an “untimely” commensurating space 
of experiential attunement whose differential material and temporal embodiment “…is its 
politics” (Yusoff, 2014: 384). Aesthetics as a category for thought, along, perhaps, with its 
correlates ethics and epistemology, is a very recent historical construct within a larger 
programmatic for a politics of universalisable human subjectivisation. An over-dependence on 
a Kantian tradition to figure “the aesthetic” as the arbiter for thinking about aesthesis limits us 
in crucial ethical and political ways. What of the many approaches to aesthetics and sensibility 
not couched in continuing a Eurocentric approach to subjective self-awareness, like, numerous 
indigenous peoples’ socialities within the non-human, or Buddhist orientations to resonant 
forms of non-duality, or South Asian rasa? They too listen and speak the experiential 
sensibility of relational co-existence. But, they require of being-with new ideas and other 
political possibilities than perhaps couched in the genealogical tradition of aesthetics. Can these 
be understood socially and politically if we begin again with Kant’s commitment to a 
transcendental phenomenology and derive politics from aesthetic critique? I argue they cannot, 
and so it follows that we cannot presume the sensibility of long distant signs and texts, like 
rock inscriptions, or songs, or dances, under an aesthetic aegis. Their ability to speak through 
perhaps familiar traces, and across aeons, may be as much about what we call “art” today, as 
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about performing feeling and presence, sensible engagements with ontological worlds 
incommensurable with any recognisable subject we know.  
It is for this reason that Leanne Simpson deliberately articulates, in her book, Dancing 
on Our Turtle’s Back, “performance” in quotation marks (2011: 34, and ft. 46, p.45) when 
writing about the processual emergence of a cosmo-politics sung, danced, filmed, spoken, etc 
in “…an individual and collective experience” (Ibid) of place and transformation. Because it 
is about diverse aestheses whose particularities are not subsumed to more general principles of 
what can become political; dance or story-telling or song, etc., are already what we may term 
political, but in different ways than those inherited from colonial conceptual registers; their 
semiotic force comes from the embodiment of “thinking-feeling” as a function of the diverse 
ecological assemblages that constitute them. What is crucial in this recognition is that dancing, 
story-telling, singing, etc. need to emerge as part of the contexts that make them possible as a 
sensible relation. As Simpson writes, “…[dance/performance] is most powerful in terms of 
transformation in its original cultural context because that context places dynamic relationships 
at the core” (Ibid.). They are always already more than simply the text itself; they are the place 
from which the text emerges, for that is the immanence of what becomes textual.  
Simpson actively invokes aesthesis, in her case, dance and song, to refuse a colonial 
politics of recognition or inclusion. If, as Alfred argues, we need “…to think thoughts that are 
outside foundational premises of [our] imperial background” (2008: 10) in order to “dance new 
worlds into existence” (Simpson, 2011: 149), I am suggesting that aesthetics is also one of 
these foundational premises. This is, as I noted at the beginning, not to argue that categories 
like “art” and “aesthetics” are not important (far from it), or that indigenous people are “closer” 
to “thinking-feeling” (that would be a false romanticism), or that indigenous perspectives are 
not able to be subjects in Euro-modern frameworks (again, false). It is simply to show that, if 
we wish to decolonise political regimes and conceptual frameworks that underpin legacies of 
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on-going human and ecological harm, we also need to re-think and decolonise one of the 
foundational conceptual premises increasingly mobilised to do this critical and political work 
– aesthetics – rather than assume it does this conceptual work for us.  
Aesthetics in an Amer-Euro-modern tradition has become tied to a representational 
mode of making sense of shared sensibility. When we swivel it as an inherited meaning making 
lens onto the question of the other (i.e. the problem of politics) and diverse sense makings, we 
interpellate that other into a mode of intelligibility through the provision of an inhabitable 
subject position (Stevenson, 2014: 161; see also Butler, 1997). Aesthetics makes possible that 
interpellation in a way that is recognizable by a particular regime as politics, rather than asking: 
what modes of difference does aesthesis as such make possible for being together or not being 
together? 
Indeed, how do we square self-conscious separation, if increasingly humble, with 
efforts to radicalise the ecologies that constitute different performative politics of life without 
also re-thinking the critique that emerges from what Kant’s separation makes possible? Think, 
for example, of other critical indigenous accounts of “performance”, what the anthropologist 
Carl Urion calls “living knowledges” (1999, as cited in Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 35), or the 
political theorists Alfred and Corntassel call “self-conscious traditionalisms” that emerge from 
specific performative commitments to the authenticity of place-based opposition and building 
social autonomies of “…conscience, non-coercive authority, and the deep interconnection 
between human beings and other elements of creation” (Alfred, 1999: 53; see also, Alfred and 
Corntassel, 2005), or what the educational theorist Stewart-Harawira invokes in her discussion 
of radical human ecologies that return to vital, sacred ontologies (2012). How do we square 
transcendental critique and the self-aware, attuned subject with a politics of self-determination 
driven by ontological and cosmological principles of spatio-temporal interconnectivity and 
reciprocity, inter-connections that work to build worlds of being-together – political worlds 
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sensu stricto – not predicated on human separation from the material relationships that make 
us possible? These, as we know, often get marginalised by modernist categories whose familial 
provenance helps to constitute the legitimacy of aesthetics as a critical register, for ex. 
‘religion’, ‘nature’, ‘subject’, etc. 
 
Conclusion 
We need to be cautious, therefore, in unproblematically claiming aesthetics identical 
with politics “…in principle” (Ranciere, 1999: 58, as cited in Dikeç 2012: 264). Often, as 
shown in the case of Kant, the principle territorialises aesthesis for an idea of politicisable 
agency, something itself built on exclusionary grounds of the human and more-than-human, 
and, so with suspect legacies. Neither politics nor aesthesis can be at their most radical when 
read within new relational conditions for the possibility of critique (Dawkins and Loftus, 2015: 
93), nor as diverse achievements in reimagining “a global communist project” (Saldanha, 2012: 
278), if aesthetics is unreconstructed. The consequence is that critique needs to be re-thought 
as a function of sensible immediacy to what felt worlds “cultivate…in their creative ground for 
relating” (Shilliam, 2015: 30). As Stevenson (Ibid: 157) writes of the Inuit katajjait (throat 
song),  
[It] is the way a particular kind of attention, figured by song, can make space for the 
existence of another, and thus, in a certain sense, call that other into being. Singing is 
not just about mouthing the words to a well known song. In its simplest sense…song 
[is] an invocation that depends less on words per se, and more on the voice as a kind of 
gesture. 
The sharing back and forth of resonating breath, touch, rhythm, and expression can be 
described in part by the category aesthetic, but the aesthesis of the song also exceeds what 
aesthetics makes possible for meaning. In generating a gathering or worlding of care, katajjait 
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also worlds forms of sociality and ethical relation outside the colonising domains of the 
aesthetic and the subject that it requires for political recognizability. 
As I have argued, we cannot square denaturalising political aesthetics on the one hand, 
with the effort to use aesthetics, especially as it is framed in the modern tradition, to deconstruct 
the fundamental division Kant helped to inaugurate. Or, rather, my concern, simply, is that we 
cannot do both: we cannot denaturalise via aporetic, excessive, or even some geo-aesthetics, 
and re-build an ontology of attunement, which, on the one hand, navigates a commitment to 
difference through symbolic contingency, and on the other seeks to commensurate that 
contingency in a shared experience of sensibility. Naturally, this tension begs the question of 
what to do with aesthetics, but more fundamentally, it also begs the question of semiosis and 
human sociality. If we want to go beyond the human, even aporetically via planetarity, then we 
need to accept alternative ontological and cosmological accounts as parallel and plural. As de 
la Cadena writes, the political problem becomes twofold: first the need “…to recognize that 
the world is more than one socio-natural formation; second we need to interconnect such 
plurality without making the diverse worlds commensurable” (2010, 361). We return full circle 
to the many alter- and indigenous ontologies to which modernist categories have been doing 
repeated epistemic violence for many centuries.  
Perhaps, then, there is scope, in bridging the posthuman and the political, to learn much 
from decolonising endeavors, which also long predate contemporary posthuman concerns. 
Doing so requires ‘partnership, connectivity, and knowledge sharing [i.e. politics] at the 
deepest material levels’ (see also, de la Cadena 2010, 361). These levels, however, mean 
engaging a new semiosis for cognition, one that emerges from more-than-human worlds 
themselves, and not from reflective judgment – a daunting, but essential, task. 
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Notes 
 
1 Kant’s sensus communis is an important facet of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy. The 
concept allows, she argues, capacities for an “enlarged mentality” whereby subjects are able 
to “liberate [themselves]…to attain that relative impartiality that is the specific virtue of 
judgment” (1992: 73; see also Dikeç, 2015: 19, and ft. 8., p.121). Enhanced potentials for 
commonality and communicability ensue. Arendt “embraced Kant’s aesthetics in her 
politics” (Dikeç, 2015: 20) so as to open up subjects’ capacities to plurality and commonality. 
The emphasis is still, however, that of a phenomenologically limited subject navigating her 
own separation from others. For a lucid explanation of Arendt’s political aesthetic, and its 
relation to Kant, see Dikeç’s Space, Politics and Aesthetics (2015, Chp. 2 & 3). 
 
2 Mignolo capitalises the second “T” in “aesthetics” to draw attention to its difference from 
aesthesis, which he mirrors as “aestheSis”. 
 
3 I put “nature” in quotes because, as a concept, it too is a product of the modern 
epistemological division between res cogitans (thought or word) and res extensa (matter or 
world). It is a conceit indigenous thought and scholarship has always critiqued (see, amongst 
many, for ex. Graham, 2008). 
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